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in Renewing Philosophy (1992), hav-ing surveyed a number of metaphysi-
cal programs in contemporary analytic 
philosophy, including Bernard Williams’ 
appeal to an absolute conception of the 
world, ruth Millikan’s attempt to reduce 
intentionality to biological function, and 
nelson Goodman’s irrealism, putnam 
concludes as follows:
i have argued that the decision 
of a large part of contemporary 
analytic philosophy to become a 
form of metaphysics is a mistake. 
indeed, contemporary analytic 
metaphysics is in many ways a 
parody of the great metaphysics 
of the past. as Dewey pointed out, 
the metaphysics of previous epochs 
had a vital connection to the culture 
of those epochs, which is why it 
was able to change the lives of men 
and women, and not always for 
the worse. contemporary analytic 
metaphysics has no connection 
with anything but the “intuitions” 
of a handful of philosophers. it 
lacks what Wittgenstein called 
“weight”. (putnam 1992, p. 197)
PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM AND  




putnam has called for a renewal of philosophy by 
invoking the names of Wittgenstein and Dewey, 
both strong critics of traditional metaphysics. in 
the light of his own attacks on various forms of 
metaphysics (e.g. metaphysical realism, the fact/
value distinction), one question that arises is 
this: what is the fate of metaphysics in putnam’s 
vision of philosophy? The present paper explores 
this question by reading putnam as committed 
to a broadly pragmatist approach to metaphys-
ics exemplified in different ways by James and 
Dewey. i end by providing several different ways 
of understanding putnam’s claim that “there is 
a sense in which it is the task of philosophy to 
overcome metaphysics and a sense in which its 
task is to continue metaphysical discussion”. 
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if contemporary analytic metaphysics is a mistake then is the point that we should try 
to revive traditional metaphysical programs? or should we perhaps renovate metaphys-
ics so that it will, once again, have “a vital connection” to culture? or, more radically, 
is the renewal of philosophy that putnam calls for a vision of a non-metaphysical form 
of philosophising—what we might call philosophising without philosophical “musts”? 
That would certainly fit with the invocation of Wittgenstein and Dewey whose thera-
peutic aims seem to stand in stark contrast to the program of constructive metaphys-
ics. and it is undeniable that at least part of putnam’s vision of what philosophy ought 
to be involves resisting the revisionist tendencies of substantial metaphysical programs 
in order to do justice to our everyday life-world. philosophy, unlike contemporary an-
alytic metaphysics, ought never to lose contact with the question of how we ought to 
live or with forms of thought that have ‘weight’ in our lives.
The question i want to address in this paper is whether this vision spells the end of meta-
physics as such or only of a particular kind of metaphysics of which the analytic version 
is an example? What is the fate of metaphysics on putnam’s conception? Various features 
of his position might suggest an end of metaphysics reading in something like the spirit 
of logical positivism. for the positivists, recall, metaphysical expressions are meaning-
less pseudo-statements lacking any cognitive meaning or truth-value. such a concep-
tion is consistent with putnam’s long-running battle with metaphysical realism, which 
he describes on more than one occasion as “a metaphysical fantasy” (putnam 1999, p. 6). 
This reading can also seem to fit nicely with putnam’s status as a leading neo-pragmatist, 
the kind of philosopher who, in the words of richard rorty, “does not think of himself 
as any kind of metaphysician” (rorty 1982, p. xxviii). furthermore, putnam’s work for 
more than two decades has shown a strong sympathy with the writings of ludwig Wit-
tgenstein, who describes his own philosophical project as “bring[ing] words back from 
their metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein 1953, § 116). 
on this way of looking at things, putnam’s claim that traditional metaphysics had a 
vital connection to the cultures in which it flourished can be glossed as a statement 
about a time when philosophical reflection had yet to reach a stage of maturity from 
which it could see its way past the construction of metaphysical systems. The recent 
recrudescence of metaphysics in analytic philosophy has simply failed to see that there 
is no longer any question of returning to the grand old days of traditional metaphysical 
inquiry. Metaphysics, on this reading, is nothing but luftgebäude, as Wittgenstein puts 
it, castles of air (Wittgenstein 1953, § 118).  
although there is more than a grain of truth in this reading, i take it that it misses the 
depth and complexity of putnam’s attitude to metaphysics. The guiding idea of this 
paper is that clarity can be shed on this region of putnam’s thought only if it is under-
stood as the latest incarnation of a pragmatist approach to metaphysical systems exem-
plified in different ways by the work of William James and John Dewey. 
The pragmatist approach to metaphysics has been unjustly neglected in contemporary 
philosophy for two main reasons both having to do with the rise of logical positivism. 
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in the first place the prestige of pragmatism has suffered on account of a widespread 
misreading which regards it as little more than an implausible analysis of truth in terms 
of verifications and practical benefits. secondly, the pragmatist approach was eclipsed 
in the twentieth century by the powerful and sweeping logical positivist conception of 
metaphysics as meaningless pseudo-statements. 
The paper is divided into three parts. The first considers James’s appeal to practical fac-
tors to help determine whether a metaphysical claim is true. The second turns to Dew-
ey’s more skeptical diagnostic approach to metaphysics. and the last part argues that 
putnam can be located on the unstable ground that lies between these two positions. 
Before turning to consider James, however, it is worth providing a brief sketch, how-
ever incomplete and preliminary, of the traditional conception of metaphysics since it 
is this conception, first and foremost, that the pragmatists are suspicious of. 
1. Traditional metaphysics: a sketch 
The term “metaphysics” was first used to refer to certain works of aristotle. traditional 
metaphysical inquiry as practised in Europe from the middle ages through to the nine-
teenth century retains a connection to aristotle’s idea of a science of being qua be-
ing, the most general study of existence or reality distinct from, and supposedly more 
fundamental than, any special science. in this traditional conception it is an a priori 
enquiry concerned to provide a complete and comprehensive explanation of the way 
the world appears to be in terms of some particular conception of an underlying real-
ity. The metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality departs significantly 
from the everyday understandings of these terms as concretely applied to, say, the mo-
tives of politicians, the shapes of distant objects, or the looks of colours. The ‘reality’ 
the metaphysician is concerned with is something hidden and only revealed through 
some combination of intuition (or revelation) and argument. a crucial assumption of 
the metaphysician is that if we could comprehend or know this underlying reality then 
we could provide an absolute or final explanation of the ‘appearances’ of things, one 
that is basic and supposed to hold once and for all. plato’s forms, leibniz’s monads, 
Kant’s things-in-themselves, and Descartes’ mental substances are familiar examples of 
metaphysical entities employed to play a role in this kind of explanation. 
a contemporary, and representative, metaphysician is frank Jackson who writes:
Metaphysics… is about what there is and what it is like… Metaphysicians seek 
a comprehensive account of some subject matter—the mind, the semantic, or 
most ambitiously, everything—in terms of a limited number of more or less 
basic notions… [“serious metaphysics”] attempt[s] to explain it all… in terms of 
some limited set of fundamental ingredients. (Jackson 1994, p. 25) 
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note the typical features of traditional metaphysics: the unfamiliar use of the appear-
ance/reality distinction; the claim that some (few) things are fundamental; and the 
claim that everything can be explained in terms of such things. in this explanation 
‘appearances’ are either to be eliminated or reduced to (or ‘located’ in) the ‘reality’ that 
the metaphysician recognizes as fundamental.  
2. James and the truth of metaphysics
in his famous volume What is Pragmatism James presents pragmatism, in the first in-
stance, as opposing what he calls intellectualist metaphysics: 
[a pragmatist] turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins. (James 1975, p. 31).
This dimension of his thought appears to be a rehearsal of the Kantian strategy of elim-
inating a dogmatic kind of metaphysics in favour of another more acceptable kind. The 
application of the pragmatic principle—to clarify our ideas or concepts of an object 
by “consider[ing] what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve” 
(James 1975, p. 29)—is advertised as undermining rationalist metaphysics but leav-
ing empiricist metaphysics relatively unscathed. Thus James speaks of pragmatism as 
representative of “the empiricist attitude” (James 1975, pp. 4, 31), an attitude which has 
“anti-intellectualist tendencies” (James 1975, p. 5). although he presents pragmatism 
as “a method only” (James 1975, p. 31), not a metaphysical position, James regards 
his own metaphysics of experience—the doctrine of radical empiricism—as fitting par-
ticularly well with it. consequently, although inimical to intellectualist metaphysics, 
pragmatism is presented as at least compatible with, perhaps even sympathetic to, em-
piricist metaphysics.
But there is another side to James’s pragmatism that is in tension with this. in applying 
the pragmatic maxim to metaphysical claims, if there are no specific experiences to be 
expected, one must consider the conduct to be recommended and any emotional or 
other reactions that the object under consideration, supposing it exists, would elicit. 
James’s liberal understanding of what constitutes practical effects puts pressure on him 
to acknowledge that a pragmatic defence of the intellectualist metaphysics he officially 
opposes is available.
on James’s view it is a significant advantage of pragmatism that traditional metaphysi-
cal disputes, which would otherwise be interminably irresolvable on grounds of a pri-
ori reason or empirical evidence, are able to be settled by appeal to pragmatic consid-
erations. Thus James writes,
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in every genuine metaphysical debate some practical issue, however conjectural 
and remote, is involved. (James 1975, p. 5) 
James suggests that it is not retrospectively but prospectively that the practical value of 
metaphysical systems reveals itself. for example, on this basis he argues that the dis-
pute between materialism and theism, which cannot be decided by appeal to epistemic 
considerations of evidence or explanatory power, can decisively be settled in favour of 
theism. his claim is that belief in God can satisfy a widespread desire for a philosophy 
of promise or hope when we consider the future course of the world since “the notion 
of God… guarantees an ideal [moral] order” (James 1975, p. 6). 
similarly, when James examines the traditional metaphysical topics of substance, the 
absolute (of German idealism), design in nature and free will, the only thing that he 
decisively rejects on pragmatic grounds is substance, the mere bearer of properties that 
locke suspiciously called a we-know-not-what. all the rest provide some basis for an 
attitude of hope, either by implying that there is an eternal rational order in the uni-
verse that does not depend on us or, in the case of free will, by implying that there will 
be novelties in the future. as these examples demonstrate, a metaphysical topic that 
might have seemed pointless from either a rational or empirical point of view is re-
vealed as having, at least for a certain class of minds, beneficial pragmatic effects such 
as feelings of confidence or comfort, particularly when the future course of the world 
is taken into account.
like the positivists, James holds that metaphysical disputes are not settled by appeal to 
empirical evidence or a priori reason. his invocation of pragmatic value makes avail-
able non-epistemic reasons to help decide in favour of the truth of one side or the 
other of a metaphysical dispute that would otherwise be undecidable. That is, James 
treats the benefits of believing in some metaphysical posit as being part of the rationale 
for so believing. consequently, the unreality and unwieldy abstraction of the absolute, 
say, which counts against it as far as truth is concerned, is balanced by the fact that 
since it “yield[s] a religious comfort to a class of minds… [it is] true ‘in so far forth’” 
(James 1975, p. 12). 
James’s pragmatism, then, ultimately has very little anti-metaphysical bite. Whilst he 
claims to stand opposed to empty intellectualism, whether in the form of merely ver-
bal disputes or metaphysical posits that lack practical value, he is forced to admit that 
most intellectualist metaphysics is, upon reflection, free of these deficiencies. pragma-
tism, for James, makes available new opportunities for discovering which metaphysics 
is true all things considered. 
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3. Dewey and the content of metaphysics
Dewey is a more robustly anti-metaphysical thinker than James although, as we will 
see, there is an important qualification to be made. By conceiving philosophy as a 
broadly empirical method of inquiry, Dewey renders traditional metaphysics (or 
“absolutistic philosophies”) obsolete. Dewey’s experimentalism leaves no room for 
any purely a priori inquiry into the (putatively) hidden and fixed nature of the world. 
of the problems of traditional metaphysics Dewey writes, “We do not solve them; 
we get over them” (Dewey 1910, p. 7). in contrast to James, he does not think that 
a consideration of the practical significance of metaphysical systems provides any 
vindication of them. two main points of difference are worth noting: 1) for James, 
practical significance is a criterion of the truth of a metaphysical system; whereas for 
Dewey it primarily bears on the question of its content; and 2) Dewey’s conception of 
the practical significance of a metaphysical system is rooted in the social and historic 
conditions under which that system was invented and flourished. James’s account, 
alternatively, focuses on the relation of metaphysics to allegedly trans-historic hu-
man needs such as “the need of an eternal moral order” (James 1975, p. 6). Dewey 
remarks,
Metaphysics is a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of higher 
moral and social values—that is the leading theme of the classic philosophy of 
Europe, as evolved by plato and aristotle… [and] renewed and restated by the 
christian philosophy of Medieval Europe. (Dewey 1967-90, vol. 12, p. 89) 
Metaphysics is here seen as the illusion of a timeless foundation for what are in fact 
local and changeable moral and social values. at the same time it is, together with tra-
ditional epistemology, a consolation of the purely speculative mind for its inability to 
change the world:
in truth, historic intellectualism, the spectator view of knowledge, is a purely 
compensatory doctrine which men of an intellectual turn have built up to 
console themselves for the actual social impotency of the calling of thought to 
which they are devoted. (Dewey 1957, p. 117)
of course this conception of metaphysics is not one that the metaphysician himself 
could reflectively endorse. Dewey’s is a diagnostic approach that implies that meta-
physics characteristically involves self-deception. it is not really a study of the timeless, 
universal or necessary features of reality, as it takes itself to be, for there is no such 
thing on Dewey’s view. it plays an imaginary role of apparently securing a transcen-
dent account of the source and authority of what is, in reality, attributable to custom 
and human history. Metaphysics thus consoles us for its inability to play any genuine or 
authentic moral or social function. 
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This account, far from vindicating metaphysics, is no less destructive of it than logical 
positivism is. Metaphysical questions lack genuine empirical or practical value, and the 
apparent authority they provide for a community’s moral and social values is a grand 
illusion. perhaps one should add that Dewey is sensitive to the way in which such illu-
sions can, nonetheless, be forces in world history. But he is the last person to want to 
perpetuate these myths. so, if the moral function of metaphysics cannot be appealed 
to as a defence of it and one has followed Dewey in abandoning a priori inquiry, what 
hope is there for the future of metaphysics? in this vein he writes,
is there not reason for believing that the release of philosophy of its burden of 
sterile metaphysics and sterile epistemology instead of depriving philosophy 
of problems and subject-matter would open a way to questions of the most 
perplexing and the most significant sort? (Dewey 1957, p. 126)
nonetheless, in spite of the strongly anti-metaphysical tendencies of his thinking, Dew-
ey surprisingly follows James in attempting to articulate what he calls a “metaphysics” 
of experience. The tension in Dewey’s position is mitigated to some extent by an ex-
plicit attempt to employ the old metaphysical vocabulary in a new more pragmatic 
spirit. Thus, what he calls “metaphysics” is not concerned with fixed essences, ultimate 
origins or ultimate ends but with what he calls “the more ultimate traits of the world” 
which he goes on to identify with “certain irreducible traits found in any and every 
subject of scientific inquiry” (Dewey 1967-90, vol. 8, p. 4). Examples of the objects of 
metaphysical inquiry in this sense include diversity, interaction, and change. Whereas 
traditional metaphysics typically concerns itself with the fixed and final, Dewey’s meta-
physics concerns itself with the fluid and incomplete. The impression that Dewey has 
cut off the branch he is attempting to sit on is confirmed when we ask what this new 
metaphysics consists in. What are its discoveries or insights? Dewey provides nothing 
but vague and disappointing generalities which do not have any of the power of his 
diagnostic claims or, for that matter, of the great metaphysical systems of the past. in a 
particularly revealing passage he writes:  
This is the extent and method of my “metaphysics”: - the large and constant 
features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures and successes together 
with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics, and religion which mark 
them, communicate genuine features of the world within which man lives. The 
method differs not a whit from that of any investigator who, by making certain 
observations and experiments , and by utilizing the existing body of ideas 
available for calculation and interpretation, concludes that he really succeeds in 
finding out something about some limited aspect of nature. (Dewey 1927, p. 59)  
What are the “large and constant features” of the human condition or, more broadly 
still, of what he elsewhere calls “the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds” 
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(Dewey 1929, p. 412)? and even if we can give content to such vague and general pro-
nouncements about the human condition or all existences, why call it metaphysics 
rather than anthropology or history, especially if the method is the same as that of the 
social scientist? 
Dewey eventually gave up his attempt to reinterpret metaphysics to fit his own prag-
matist standpoint. The tension in Dewey’s conception finally led to his complete re-
nunciation of metaphysics. in a reply to a critic in 1949, Dewey writes,
i now realize that it was exceedingly naïve of me to suppose that it was possible 
to rescue the word [“metaphysics”] from its deeply ingrained traditional use. i 
derive what consolation may be possible from promising myself never to use 
the word again in connection with any aspect of any part of my own position. 
(Dewey 1949, pp. 712-13) 
to take this remark seriously is to see Dewey as having a fundamentally therapeutic 
attitude to metaphysics all along. his mistake was to suppose there was any point in 
trying to rescue the term in the radically new setting of pragmatism. 
4. Putnam and the insights of metaphysics 
let us sum up the pragmatist stance to metaphysics as exemplified in James and Dew-
ey. The pragmatist is presented as a critic of the traditional intellectualist metaphy-
sician and of the merely verbal disputes often associated with such metaphysics. he 
is more congenial to a metaphysics of experience. More importantly, pragmatism is 
perhaps the first philosophical movement to seriously consider the practical func-
tion of a metaphysics: as a source of spiritual comfort; or an apparent guarantor of the 
moral and social order; or a consolation for political impotence. for James this pro-
vides some reason to think a metaphysics is true; for Dewey, on the contrary, it shows 
that metaphysics is inescapably bound up with self-deception or what existentialists 
call bad faith. for Dewey, the illusion that there is a fixed, underlying realm of Being 
is a consequence to the human capacity to transcendentalize or eternalize the time-
bound values of a particular society. Thus James’s appeal to the pragmatic significance 
of metaphysics tends to be vindicatory; whereas Dewey’s tends to be undermining. 
now let us ask: where does putnam stand on these issues? is he a Jamesian apologist 
for metaphysics or a Deweyan critic of the enterprise? as i hope will become clear i 
read putnam as sharing aspects of both the positions of James and Dewey, an uneasy 
position that is not without internal tension. i shall end this paper by raising some 
questions about how this tension might be overcome.
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in the first place, putnam is certainly a strong critic of the foundationalist and essen-
tialist pretensions of traditional metaphysics. a representative passage reads:
the long history of failures to explain in metaphysical terms how mathematics 
is possible, how nondemonstrative knowledge is possible… and so on, suggests 
nothing much follows from the failure of philosophy to come up with an 
explanation of anything in “absolute terms”—except, perhaps, the senselessness 
of a certain sort of metaphysics. (putnam 2002, p. 45)
putnam reserves his strongest criticisms for the many and various attempts to ex-
plain away or denigrate our everyday ethical thought and talk in metaphysical terms 
whether by way of the contrasts between cognitivism and non-cognitivism (e.g. simon 
Blackburn), facts and values (e.g. a.J. ayer), or absolute and perspectival knowledge 
(e.g. Bernard Williams). 
perhaps putnam’s most well-known anti-metaphysical program has been his attempt 
to salvage a small “r” realism—qualified at one time as “internal” and, more recently, 
as “pragmatic” or “natural”—from big “r” Metaphysical realism. his criticisms are 
too familiar to rehearse again in this context. What i want to call attention to is that 
putnam explicitly avoids the Kantian strategy: he is careful to distinguish natural real-
ism from any kind of metaphysical theory that might be imagined to superannuate 
Metaphysical realism. natural realism is rather an attempt to salvage a common sense 
attitude towards the world that metaphysics (and skepticism) is thought to ultimately 
deny or denigrate. We might think of this as representing the Deweyan dimension of 
his approach.
like both James and Dewey, and in contrast to the logical positivists, putnam does not 
regard traditional metaphysics as totally lacking in cognitive content. he explains,
to call upon us to renounce… the dreams of metaphysics… is not at all to join 
the logical positivists of yesteryear in calling… metaphysics… ‘nonsense’. There 
is much of permanent value in the writings of… traditional metaphysicians. 
it would be false to Dewey’s own spirit to deny that there is. (putnam 2004, p. 
105)  
But what does putnam mean by “permanent value” in this context? putnam takes 
himself to be following Dewey here but his thought is, in fact, much closer to James. 
putnam is inclined, for all of his criticisms of traditional metaphysics, to think that 
this region of philosophy contains valuable insights. Dewey, as we have seen, takes a 
more Wittgensteinian or diagnostic approach which attempts to explain metaphysics 
as an understandable intellectual distortion or “divination” of aspects of our familiar 
world for understandable reasons such as our fear of change or the theorist’s need for 
consolation for being unable to change the world for the better. Dewey, in short, does 
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not look to metaphysics as a rich seam of insights; he looks to it, rather, as an all-too-
human indulgence in mythology and consoling self-deception. 
to illustrate this difference it is worth comparing the different ways in which Dewey 
and putnam think about the role of the imagination in metaphysics. Dewey holds that 
a human being is “primarily a creature of the imagination” (Dewey 1957, p. 118) and 
that this has an important bearing on the way in which we understand what motivates 
metaphysical speculation. on his view, an important difference between metaphysics 
and scientific inquiry lies in two different employments of the same idealizing function 
of the imagination. in metaphysical thinking there is a tendency to treat ideals and ide-
alizations as realities by forgetting that they are products of human intellectual activity, 
often arising out of everyday experiences but, as Dewey puts it, “with their blemishes 
removed, their imperfections eliminated, their lacks rounded out, their suggestions 
and hints fulfilled” (Dewey 1957, pp. 105-106). plato’s forms are a classic example. The 
metaphysician plato not only treats these ideals as perfect, singular and unchangeable 
entities but as more real than the mundane realities of the world in which we live our 
lives. for a scientist, or a scientifically-minded pragmatist, however, ideals and ideal-
izations are seen as imaginative tools that help to explain or understand highly com-
plex real-world objects or events. an ideal or idealization, like an architectural model, 
is not to be assessed as simply true or false. its role is, rather, to illuminate by way of 
analogy some, but by no means all, of the important features of the target phenomena. 
The moral is that although metaphysics arises from a natural, indeed laudable, capac-
ity for idealization—a capacity that includes the construction of models and imagined 
possibilities—Dewey sees metaphysical system-building as an undisciplined employ-
ment of this capacity, one that depends on forgetting the schematic character of ideals, 
and their context-sensitive utility in highlighting some features of a particular thing to 
the exclusion of others. Dewey’s diagnostic approach is not a matter of seeing meta-
physics as containing various truths, however indirect. it would be better to say that 
metaphysics has its source in a useful capacity which, when properly employed (e.g. in 
scientific theorizing), can lead to fruitful discoveries. 
putnam follows Dewey (and Wittgenstein) in thinking that the imagination plays a 
central role in motivating metaphysical thinking but he conceives this role in a more 
Jamesian spirit. putnam employs Wittgenstein’s notion of a picture which can be vari-
ously understood as: what we would ordinarily call a picture e.g. a drawing or diagram; 
or a mental image; a rough and ready conception; an engineer’s model e.g. of a bridge; 
and so on. a picture, we might say, is a rough and ready or schematic way of seeing 
things that is to be contrasted with a fully elaborated theory. 
What, then, is the relation between pictures and metaphysics? consider the following 
passage in which putnam is comparing what he calls the picture of metaphysical real-
ism with the idealist picture of truth as consisting in idealized warranted assertibility,
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i think the idealist “picture” calls our attention to vitally important features of 
our practice—and what is the point of having “pictures” if we are not interested 
in seeing how well they represent what we actually think and do. (putnam 1990, 
p. 42)
This passage strongly suggests a representationalist conception of pictures according 
to which they represent the world well or badly. i take it that the pictures themselves 
are not simply true or false but that they can, through a certain use or employment, 
bring “vitally important features of our practices” to our attention, and, in that sense, 
represent the world. The Jamesian suggestion seems to be that traditional metaphysics, 
in so far as it is a matter of using pictures, can indirectly represent features of the world 
that we would otherwise miss. This constitutes part of its “permanent value”. 
5. The end of metaphysics? 
Where do these reflections leave the fate of metaphysics? We have seen how Dewey, 
despite some equivocation, is charitably interpreted as having an end of metaphysics 
stance. his equivocation is not a matter of thinking that traditional metaphysics has 
any life left in it; it is, rather, a matter of thinking that metaphysics can be reconcieved 
and rehabilitated on a pragmatist basis. as we have seen, Dewey has a more nuanced 
approach to traditional metaphysics than the positivists. he provides a rich account of 
its motivations in various entrenched human capacities, needs and desires but for all 
that his account is not a vindication of metaphysics, as James’s account tends to be. a 
central part of his view is that metaphysicians do not realize the nature or sources of 
their own thinking. if they did, they would be out of business. 
putnam’s attitude to the fate of metaphysics seems to be located somewhere between 
Dewey and James. he writes,
i take it as a fact of life that there is a sense in which the task of philosophy is to 
overcome metaphysics and a sense in which its task is to continue metaphysical 
discussion. (putnam 1988, p. 457)
The difficulty in interpreting this comment is to understand in what sense it is the task 
of philosophy to continue metaphysical discussion. putnam has made it quite clear that 
he thinks almost all current analytic metaphysics, and large tracts of traditional meta-
physics, are a matter of “dreams”, “fantasies”, “confusions” and “ridiculous” ideas. This 
fits well with the Deweyan (and Wittgensteinian) idea that an important task for phi-
losophy is to overcome metaphysics. But, like James in particular, he has also claimed 
that there are salvageable insights in at least some of the great systems of traditional 
metaphysics. These insights, however, were certainly not the insights the metaphysi-
cians themselves believed they had discovered. for putnam, there is no fixed realm of 
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essences or necessary truths of the sort the metaphysicians of old dreamed that they 
had discovered. one example is worth considering further. 
in lectures delivered at harvard putnam held that the insight in Metaphysical real-
ism (an insight owed to James) is that words do indeed correspond to realities but that 
there are many different kinds of correspondence relation in question not a single rela-
tion as the realist had supposed. But, note, that this insight salvaged from the meta-
physical picture of a single word-world relation is not a distinctively metaphysical in-
sight and it is certainly not the insight the Metaphysical realists themselves supposed 
they had found. 
putnam follows Dewey and Wittgenstein in holding that the metaphysician is subject 
to the illusion of taking products of his own imagination for realities. if that is so, then 
how could a contemporary metaphysician engage in metaphysical discussion without 
illusion, or self-deception, or forgetting that his pictures are pictures? in approaching 
this question it is worth reflecting that throughout the discussion we have been assum-
ing that metaphysics is a fairly well-circumscribed concept for an a priori inquiry into 
eternal essences or fixed and necessary structures of the world. But what of a philoso-
pher who holds that what reality is really like does not include essences? surely this is 
still a metaphysical stance even if it is anti-essentialist. or one could hold that there are 
essences or fixed necessities but they are in the mind or perhaps language rather than 
the external world. surely that counts as metaphysics too. or what of a philosopher 
like Quine who claims to forgo a priori theorizing but retains elements of empiricism 
or physics worship that seem like elements of a first philosophy (in so far as they are 
not subject to revision)? one is tempted to call these elements metaphysical too. The 
point is that since there are many forms that the metaphysical aspiration to explain ap-
pearances in terms of some underlying reality can take, the concept of the metaphysical 
is itself not fixed but evolves. it is what Wittgenstein calls a family resemblance con-
cept. The traditional search for essence prompted by the socratic question “What is 
X?” is simply the most important historical paradigm of metaphysics. But metaphysics 
also includes Kant’s transcendental question “how is X possible?” as well as the mod-
ern search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. 
consequently, it can be hard to say what counts as a metaphysics in any given case, 
especially if Wittgenstein is right in thinking that metaphysics often dresses itself up 
as science. so one reason for thinking that we will continue metaphysical discussion is 
that it is often unclear whether certain expressions are being employed for metaphysi-
cal purposes or not. The question of discerning what is metaphysical and what not 
thus becomes an important matter for philosophical investigation. But even if that is 
so it is not obvious that this exhausts what putnam means by speaking of the continu-
ation of metaphysical discussion—although it does seem clear that his renewed vision 
of philosophy is incompatible with the metaphysical system-building of, say, a David 
lewis or a David armstrong. 
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putnam’s remarks suggest that philosophy will always engage in metaphysical discus-
sion in at least the relatively weak sense that we are creatures who, given the facts of 
our human nature—our wants, wishes, imaginings, etc.—will inevitably drift into ask-
ing metaphysical questions and urging metaphysical answers. This view is compatible 
with a primarily therapeutic conception of philosophy that sees its aim as one of ex-
posing and interrogating metaphysical pronouncements with a view to overcoming 
them, endlessly, one by one. This would be to embrace an end to metaphysical system-
building whilst acknowledging that there will be no end to the urge to metaphysics. 
alternatively, putnam may think, as Dewey sometimes did, that there is a viable re-
conception of metaphysics that is distinct from traditional metaphysics. in the same 
vein, strawson (1959) supposed that an investigation of the general features of our 
conceptual network is a kind of metaphysics, which he called “descriptive metaphys-
ics”. We might think of it as contributing to a conception of philosophy as the attempt 
“to understand how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together 
in the broadest possible sense of the term” (sellars 1963, p. 1). But this attempt to re-
define the term ‘metaphysics’ is prone to lead to confusion, as Dewey finally saw. The 
aim of ‘descriptive metaphysics’ is to describe something that lies open to view—uses 
of language, concepts as employed in judgments—not to explain the ‘appearances’ in 
terms of something hidden i.e. some metaphysical reality. and it has no trouble ac-
cepting that our concepts are contingent, changeable and responsive to human needs. 
if one is tempted to make this move it is important not to lose sight of the great differ-
ence between, on the one hand, engaging in traditional metaphysics and, on the other, 
responding to traditional metaphysical questions by, in effect, changing the subject to 
engage in piecemeal descriptions of our concepts and their uses. 
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